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In Philosophers of Nothingness, An Essay on the Kyoto School (2000), James 
Heisig laments that recognition of the Kyoto School of Philosophy and its 
achievements has generally been retarded both in and outside Japan. The 
reason for this retardation is that the formative years of the Kyoto School 
(the decades leading up to the Second World War) coincided with a period 
of intense Japanese nationalism. As a result, the Japanese themselves did not 
consider the Kyoto School worthy of devoting much attention to after the 
Second World War; any mention of the Kyoto School had disappeared by 
the 1970s. Western philosophers eventually took an interest in the Kyoto 
School, initially by simply ignoring its troubling political record (Heisig, 
2000, pp. 3-6). The Kyoto School of Philosophy formed itself around its 
main representative Nishida Kitarō1 in the years after the publication of 
his maiden work Zen no Kenkyū (translated as An Inquiry into the Good) in 
1911. If one ignores his political writings, then from Nishida’s oeuvre can 
be distilled a religious philosophy of mind which draws on ideas formu-
lated in Zen Buddhism to theorize a form of consciousness that transcends 
the dichotomy of subject and object (what Nishida’s friend D.T. Suzuki 
would identify as satori, or enlightenment). It comes as no surprise that 
Heisig, a leading scholar on the Kyoto School, chooses to depoliticize 
Nishida as much as possible. That behind Nishida’s seemingly innocent 
religious philosophy of mind possibly lurk fascist motivations is something 
any conceptually-oriented philosopher would rather leave to colleagues 
from the Area Studies to further unravel. To comparative philosophers 
such as Heisig, Nishida’s achievements in the field of metaphysics, and 
certainly not his political mishaps, deserve most of our scholarly attention. 
However, philosophers cannot completely ignore the role politics play 
in shaping philosophical thought. Tosaka Jun, a contemporary critic of 
the Kyoto School of Philosophy whose critique of hermeneutics forms 
the subject of this paper, poured a lot of effort into demonstrating this. 
He argued that much of the thought of the Japanese philosophers of his 
generation was informed by an ethnocentrism fueled by the ambitions of 
a nationalistic government. When it comes to showing how politics shape 
philosophy, his scathing attack on the Kyoto School is still relevant today. 
The lofty ideal of Zen enlightenment, to apply Tosaka’s analysis to the 
most prominent example, quickly loses its value and becomes wholly vacu-
ous if its Japanese proponents are convinced that only they are sensible 
enough to experience it, and are thereby the only ones that have access to 
the world as it supposedly ‘really is’. The idea of Zen enlightenment may 
just have been redeveloped by Japanese intellectuals specifically in order to 
combat Western claims to universalism, and to thereby contest the global 
political hegemony of the Western powers at the end of the nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth century. If this is true, then compara-
tive philosophers can no longer unproblematically dispose of this concept’s 
ethnocentric kernel in order to universalize its application. Instead, phi-
losophers in the West need to be cautious of the extent to which concepts 
formulated by thinkers of the Kyoto School have been informed by, to put 
it crudely, a political ideology that encouraged ethnocentric irrationalism. 
This paper offers an investigation of the roots of the concepts and 
methods that Kyoto School philosophers employ – an investigation that 
is not only conceptual but also historical. I do this, not only by retro-
spectively retracing the origin of the ideas of prominent Kyoto School 
philosophers such as Nishida and Tanabe Hajime, but also by considering 
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the methods of those who were drawn to, and took their inspiration from, 
Nishida’s philosophy, such as Suzuki, Kuki Shūzō and Watsuji Tetsurō. For 
the purposes of this paper, I will treat all of these thinkers as Kyoto School 
philosophers, even though their association with the school (especially 
in the case of Suzuki) might have been rather loose at times. The main 
focus of this paper is Tosaka’s critique of the hermeneutic methodology 
of the philosophers mentioned above. With Tosaka, I want to question 
the political motivations of these thinkers, and show why their applica-
tion of hermeneutics (what Tosaka calls their ‘philologism’) is problematic. 
Moreover, I want to show that according to Tosaka, part of the problem 
lies with hermeneutics itself, rather than only with its application. 
In the first section, I explain the circumstances under which philosophy 
came to fruition in Japan. I briefly recount Nishi Amane’s introduction of 
philosophy to Japan upon returning from his journey to Europe in 1865. 
This is followed by a discussion of two European intellectuals that shaped 
the direction of early Japanese philosophical thought: Raphael von Koeber 
(who taught aesthetics and hermeneutics at Tokyo University), and Paul 
Carus (who influenced Suzuki, and thereby indirectly Nishida). I then 
turn to examine Nishida’s notion of junsui keiken (pure experience), and 
show how this notion relates to the hermeneutics of Watsuji and Suzuki’s 
understanding of satori (enlightenment). I end the first section by discuss-
ing the anti-modernism of Kuki, who, instead of delving into ancient texts, 
hermeneutically reconstructs an eighteenth century Edo (the city known 
today as Tokyo) aesthetic style known as iki. The second section concerns 
Tosaka’s criticism of these various applications of hermeneutics. He argues 
that we should focus on what he calls ‘everydayness’, and not have an 
idealized past serve as a model that dictates what we should do in the here-
and-now. The problem with such an idealized past is that it constitutes a 
separate world of meaning which is easily manipulated by those in power 
and made to serve elitist political goals. In the third section, I turn to Tosa-
ka’s 1935 book Nihon Ideorogīron in order to reconstruct his critique of the 
hermeneutic method itself. Tosaka thinks that hermeneutics is inherently 
oriented towards the past, something which he shows through a discussion 
of the hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey and 
Martin Heidegger. As a Western methodology for uncovering meaning 
from the past, Tosaka deems hermeneutics fundamentally unable to assist 
the Japanese in understanding their own historical condition. He argues 
that hermeneutics merely concerns itself with what has already been done, 
and never with actual problems at hand. The fourth section briefly consid-
ers whether Tosaka’s criticism of hermeneutics and the Kyoto School is fair. 
I conclude that although Tosaka’s own methodological orientation limits a 
fair assessment of the Kyoto School of Philosophy, he nevertheless shows 
us why Western philosophers in our day and age have to at least be wary of 
too hastily and uncritically drawing inspiration from it. 
The Kyoto School and hermeneutics
The forced opening up of Japan in 1855 by American Commodore Mat-
thew Perry made it clear to the Japanese military government at that time, 
the Tokugawa shogunate, that its policy of seclusion (Japan had been closed 
off to the outside world for over two hundred years, highly restricting trade 
with foreign countries) was no longer tenable. The shogunate realized that it 
would have to catch up with the West in order to survive in a world in which 
most of Asia had been colonized. Between 1862 and 1867, a small number 
of Japanese scholars was sent out to the academic centers of the West in order 
to study Western forms of knowledge. Among them was Nishi, who was 
dispatched to Leiden University in 1863 to study law. He had studied Dutch 
in the capital Edo and was a bureaucratic intellectual involved in translating 
Western works (generally on science) for the Tokugawa shogunate (Havens, 
1970, pp. 40-76). While abroad, Nishi soon turned his attention to the 
study of philosophy. He is generally credited as the person who introduced 
Western philosophy to Japan. Besides the word tetsugaku2 (philosophy), he 
is responsible for translating into Japanese a large quantity of philosophical 
vocabulary still in use today. Since he focused mostly on the empirical phi-
losophy of Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill, and hardly on the German 
idealism that would gain popularity among those associated with the later 
Kyoto School of Philosophy, he has been also called the ‘isolated father of 
philosophy in Japan’ (Takayanagi, 2011, p. 81).
German idealism found its way to Japan after the Meiji Restoration 
of 1868 (which restored the emperor as the head of state). Following 
the Meiji Restoration, contact with the outside world intensified as the 
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country attempted to rapidly modernize itself. As a result of the active 
pursuit of modernization, foreign intellectuals were invited to lecture at 
the universities of Japan, and Japanese students actively sought out ways to 
study in the West. Two Europeans that shaped early Japanese philosophi-
cal thought were Von Koeber and Carus. Von Koeber arrived in Japan in 
1893 and started teaching at the University of Tokyo. Among his students 
were Nishida, Watsuji and Kuki. Von Koeber placed special emphasis on 
the theory of aesthetics of Arthur Schopenhauer, encouraging his students 
to go beyond Immanuel Kant’s theory of the aesthetic judgment and to 
see art as a way to overcome cultural decadence (which, in Von Koeber’s 
eyes, plagued nineteenth century Europe). As Alejandro Bárcenas puts 
it: ‘...aesthetics was set before them [the students of Von Koeber, DP] as 
a means to preserve classical culture from destruction, to overcome the 
dominance of scientific knowledge, and to connect meaningfully with the 
world as a whole.’ (2009, p. 17) At the same time, Von Koeber exposed 
his students to the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Karl August Beck. 
His approach to hermeneutics took as its starting point the interpretation 
of ancient texts. Von Koeber provided his students an impetus to investi-
gate their own culture by applying the hermeneutic method to traditional 
Japanese concepts (Mayeda, 2006, p. 6). He wanted to convey to his stu-
dents that European modernization was not something to be admired and 
striven after, but rather a sign of its cultural decay. He urged the young 
philosophers studying under him to delve into their own past for models 
on how to reform their society, instead of mindlessly emulating European 
culture. 
Two ancient texts that came to be subjected to hermeneutical inter-
pretation by Von Koeber’s students were the Kojiki3 and the Nihon Shoki4 
(together called the Kiki), which were composed at the beginning of the 
eighth century of the Common Era. These texts were seen as central to 
the people of Japan, as they (to a large extent mythologically) describe 
the birth of the nation. The Kiki provide descriptions of historical events 
that overlap in some, and conflict in other cases – hence the need for 
interpretation. To the interpreters of the Meiji period (1868-1912), it was 
important to discover the ‘authentic truth’ hidden in the texts in order to 
legitimize an imperial rule that had only recently been restored (Isomae, 
2014, p. 1). The preceding Tokugawa shogunate had been perceived by 
the intellectual elite as reluctant of large-scale reform, which the Meiji 
emperor actively pursued instead.5 These intellectuals thought that it was 
imperative for the survival of the Japanese nation to modernize in order to 
create a strong military that could compete with the armies of the West-
ern powers (the national slogan of the Meiji period being fukoku kyōhei, 
‘enrich the state, strengthen the military’; Beasley, 1972, pp. 1-2). Watsuji 
would go on to publish a book on the Kiki in 1920, titled Nihon Kodai 
Bunka,6 in which he argued that the Kiki had their origins in an oral tra-
dition. This was important, since the influx of Chinese characters at the 
time the Kiki were compiled, betrayed possible Chinese influences, a fact 
the Japanese were desperate to denounce. Many subsequent attempts were 
made to interconnect the Kiki and the idea of a ‘Pure Japanese Culture’ 
(Beasley, 1972, p. 6).
Carus was a German orientalist and scholar of religion. D.T. Suzuki, 
who is considered the most important figure in the spread of Zen Bud-
dhism to the West, began studying under Carus when he moved to La 
Salle, Illinois in 1897. Carus thought there was no essential difference 
between scientific and religious truth. To have faith means to place one’s 
trust in this unified truth. It was unnecessary to completely do away with 
old religions – instead, they had to be purified of irrational elements. He 
considered Buddhism the most scientific of all religious systems, since it 
ignores all metaphysical assumptions and philosophical postulates and 
concerns itself only with the facts of pure experience. Although Suzuki 
himself would eventually deny that Carus had been much of an influ-
ence on the development of his thought, most of what Suzuki would later 
claim to be Zen quite neatly matches how Carus thought about Buddhism 
(Sharf, 1993, pp. 13-17).
Through Suzuki, the influence of Carus extends all the way to Nishida, 
who became Suzuki’s lifelong friend after meeting him in high school; the 
two shared an early interest in Zen (Sharf, 1993, p. 12). Nishida’s own 
philosophical enterprise can be summed up as a lifelong elucidation of the 
concept of junsui keiken (pure experience). This notion is used by Nishida 
to designate the condition of experiencing reality itself, without it being 
in any way constituted by the subjective categories of thought (Maraldo, 
2015). Suzuki would equate Nishida’s concept of pure experience with 
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the experience of satori (enlightenment) that could be reached by means 
of Zen practice, an Eastern Buddhist tradition that the Japanese claimed 
to have had perfected (Sharf, 1993, p. 24). This opened up the idea that 
the Japanese had some form of privileged access to noumenal reality – 
an idea with which Western claims to universalism could be contested. 
Watsuji would attempt to locate the origins of the concept of ‘pure experi-
ence’ in the works of the ancient poets of the Manyoshū,7 ‘...whose feelings 
still retain a virgin simplicity as a single undivided experience, [and who] 
are not yet troubled by this division of the subjective and the objective.’ 
(Furukawa, 1961, p. 224) But it seems that more than the musings of 
ancient poets, it had been Carus’ remarks about Buddhism’s concern for 
the facts of pure experience, combined with William James’ ideas on the 
topic, that inspired Nishida to come to his notion of junsui keiken. James’ 
influence is readily apparent in the opening pages of his 1911 work Zen no 
Kenkyū, where Nishida writes the following (I have added his own foot-
notes in brackets):
An abstract concept is never something that transcends experience, for it 
is always a form of present consciousness. Just as a geometrician imagines 
a particular triangle and takes it to be representative of all triangles, the 
representation element of an abstract concept is no more than a type of 
feeling in the present [James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, chap.
vii.]. And if we consider the so-called fringe of consciousness a fact 
of direct experience, then even consciousness of the various relations 
between experiental facts is – like sensation and perception – a kind 
of pure experience [James, ‘A World of Pure Experience’.] (1990, pp. 
4-5)
Zen no Kenkyū established Nishida’s name in Japan and launched his 
academic career. Taking up the chair of philosophy at Kyoto Imperial Uni-
versity in 1914, he came to influence a whole subsequent generation of 
Japanese philosophers – a generation that increasingly found itself strug-
gling to liberate Japanese philosophy from its Western heritage. 
Kuki, one of Von Koeber’s students and later one of Heidegger’s, was 
one such philosopher who attempted to go beyond Western thought. His 
hermeneutical undertaking of reviving classical Japanese culture in order 
to educate the alienated masses (who were rapidly westernizing) did not so 
much involve the study of ancient texts such as the Kiki, but rather focused 
on the pre-capitalist culture found in early nineteenth century Edo. In his 
1930 work Iki no Kōzō,8 Kuki identified iki as a uniquely Japanese aesthetic 
style that had come to fruition at the end of the late eighteenth century, 
and which was therefore free from the influence of Western metaphys-
ics. An understanding of iki could point to authentically Japanese ways 
of being, and provide a way to rid Japanese society of foreign modernis-
tic influences (Harootunian, 2000, 31). However, as Leslie Pincus points 
out, Kuki was only able to formulate his critique of modernity precisely 
because he was a part of it. More importantly, the hermeneutical tools he 
had used to recover iki from the past had been provided by Westerners in 
the first place. The fact that Kuki searched for the distinctively Japanese in 
the recent past rather than ancient times belies the influence of Dilthey, 
the father of cultural hermeneutics, who argues interpretation can only 
reconstruct lifeforms that are at least minimally familiar to us. Hermeneu-
tics was meant to recover exactly those traditions from which the present 
was about to be estranged (Pincus, 1991, pp. 145-146). Kuki, it turns out, 
had only been trying to escape the lion by hiding in its den. 
Others, such as Watsuji, went further into the past to locate the Japanese 
spirit, but all these attempts, like Kuki’s, simply ended up being nothing 
more than constructions that tried to locate certain eternal characteris-
tics of the Japanese people in purportedly age-old traditions and classical 
texts. Possibly in order to satisfy government officials (and out of fear of 
being subjected to censorship in the future), Nishida somewhat reluctantly 
joined this trend of establishing the timeless traits of the Japanese people in 
a 1934 essay (translated as The Types of Culture of the Classical Periods of East 
and West Seen from a Metaphysical Perspective) in which he wrote that the 
difference between the metaphysics of the West and the East is ultimately 
reducible to fundamental differences in culture. The ultimate ground of 
Western metaphysics is that of being, while that of Eastern metaphysics is 
nothingness. Since Japanese culture, Nishida argued, is based in zettai-mu 
(absolute nothingness), the Japanese inherently prefer ‘...immanence to 
transcendence, the here-and-now to the eternal, emotion to intellection, 
family bonds to general law and order, the formlessness of time to the solid 
geometry of space.’ (Heisig, 2001, pp. 86-87) These characterizations of 
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the Japanese were certainly met with enthusiasm by those in power, and it 
was not long before Nishida was invited by the government to a commit-
tee to reform academia to better reflect the Japanese spirit. In 1935, this 
government fell to a military coup by far-right nationalists, and fears that 
the freedom of thought and expression would be restricted in the name of 
national unity would soon become reality (Heisig, 2001, pp. 88-89). It is 
in this difficult period that Tosaka would write most of his works. 
Tosaka’s general critique of Kyoto School hermeneutics
In 1935, Tosaka’s book Nihon Ideorogīron9 is published (a title inspired 
by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ Die Deutsche Ideologie). In this book, 
Tosaka offers an attack on Kyoto School thought, partly through a critique 
of their use of hermeneutics. Tosaka himself was born in Tokyo in 1900 
and studied philosophy in Kyoto under Nishida and his successor Tanabe, 
graduating in 1924. In the late 1920s, his attention switched from Neo-
Kantianism to Marxism. From then on, he began investigating ideology 
rather than scientific methodology (the latter of which Tanabe had been 
primarily concerned with at that time). He co-founded the Society for 
the Study of Materialism, and made it a vehicle for battling militarism 
and irrationalism. Perceived to be a threat to national unity (confirming 
that Nishida’s fears were in fact real), he was dismissed from his teaching 
position in 1934 for ‘seditious thought’. He was eventually arrested under 
the Peace Preservation Law in 1938, and died in Nagano Prison in 1945, 
on the day the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki (De 
Bary, Gluck & Tiedemann, 1964, p. 251). Before turning to Tosaka’s more 
fundamental critique of hermeneutics itself in the next section, I will first 
provide an overview of his problems in general with the appropriation of 
hermeneutics by the thinkers of the Kyoto School. 
I will begin with the object which the Japanese philosophers hope 
to distill using their interpretative strategies, namely the authentic Japa-
nese spirit. Tosaka thinks the quest for the Japanese spirit is the result of 
a tendency towards Japanism (nihon shugi), which he describes as a social 
activity that is backed by nothing but an emotion, and as such is intel-
lectually empty. Japanism concerns the attempt to constitute a universe of 
meaning that separates itself from concrete historical reality by suggesting 
there is such a thing as a unique Japanese spirituality, an idea which to 
Tosaka is nonsensical, ridiculous and childish. As De Bary, et al., translate 
him: 
...in essence (…) the Japanese spirit – or what Japan is in itself – is not, 
according to Japanism’s own insistence, an explainable object; indeed, 
when closely scrutinized, it is nothing other than a method and a 
principle employed in explaining everything rather arbitrarily. However, 
arbitrarily bringing forth the single geographical, historical, and social 
existence in the universe called Japan and letting it become a kind of 
philosophical principle is, in essence, something very weird when 
considered from the standpoint of common sense. Indeed, if this were a 
philosophy termed ‘Venus-ism’ or ‘Daffodil-ism’, no one would ever take 
it seriously from the beginning. But the problem is that at the same time 
that it can be thought that Japanism has no rational or scientific content 
whatsoever, one is able arbitrarily to read into it any content whatsoever. 
(Tosaka 1977, pp. 146-147; De Bary et al., 1964, p. 255)
In other words, the meaning that Japanese hermeneuticians purport to 
uncover in ancient texts is in fact the result of employing an interpreta-
tive principle that can be conjured up to apply to anything, anywhere 
– thus rendering all their efforts fundamentally meaningless. He goes on 
to cite Takasu Yoshijirō, who claims that the Japanese spirit ‘...consist[s] 
of such things as that it is “life-creationistic”, “centered and unwaver-
ing”, “excels in cohesion and harmony”, “takes as its principle positively 
to progress and expand”, “has the characteristic of clarity”, “places 
emphasis on practice and the actualization of the Way.’’’ (De Bary et 
al., 1964, p. 253) All of these qualifications, however, are according to 
Tosaka either retraceable to foreign influences, or can be applied uni-
versally, that is to say, to any culture anywhere, anytime, and therefore 
describe nothing unique. Needless to say, Tosaka would consider the 
same principle to be at work when Kuki, studying the culture of the 
late Edo period, claims to have uncovered iki to be the essence of the 
Japanese spirit, or when Nishida, studying Buddhist texts, claims it to 
be zettai-mu. The only central tenet Tosaka is able to infer from these 
strategies to uncover the Japanese spirit is that this spirit is supposed 
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to be superior to that of other people. However, what sort of thing the 
Japanese spirit is and how it is supposed to be superior has not been 
given a sufficiently rational explanation (De Bary et al., 1964, p. 255).
Since Japanism constitutes an abstract universe of meaning of its 
own, it has nothing to do with daily reality. It is precisely the everydayness 
(nichijōsei) of daily reality that Tosaka wishes to draw attention to. Daily 
customs are in need of interpretation. Something as mundane as cloth-
ing requires philosophical explanation (Harootunian, 2000, pp. 119-120). 
Rather than abhor the masses, an effort should first be made to understand 
them. This is because, to Tosaka, the everyday is the site where history 
unfolds itself. Minimal day-to-day changes in customs, reflected in com-
modities such as clothes, make up history. The masses, more so than the 
elites who are the ones to write history down as a narrative, are essentially 
involved in its production. By dwelling in an idealized past in an effort to 
reconstruct bygone traditions and sensibilities, the Kyoto School philoso-
phers (representing the elite) effectively ignore the potential that is hidden 
in the current historical epoch, the here-and-now. The fact that the Kyoto 
School philosophers make use of Western hermeneutical tools to search 
in the past for the cultural essence of the Japanese people implies a tacit 
acceptation of Western philosophical approaches to history – using these 
tools, the Japanese will never discover anything about themselves. Tosaka 
argues that Western philosophical approaches to history are characterized 
by a negligence of everydayness in favor of a metaphysical binding to an 
essential past – something he finds exemplified in Heidegger’s 1927 work 
Sein und Zeit. Tosaka there finds Heidegger writing:
In its factical Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is ‘what’ it 
already was. It is its past, whether explicitly or not. And this is so not 
only in that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along ‘behind’ it, and 
that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present-at-
hand and which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein ‘is’ its past 
in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of 
its future on each occasion. (1962, p. 41)
Heidegger tends to value everydayness (Alltäglichkeit) somewhat nega-
tively, associating it with the mediocrity of the great masses of the people, 
the ‘they’ (das Man). Completely reminiscent of the anti-modernist stance 
of many Japanese philosophers of this period, Heidegger writes: 
In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information 
services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This 
Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into 
the kind of Being of ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the 
Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this 
inconspiciousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the 
‘they’ is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] 
take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see 
and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink 
back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The ‘they’, which is 
nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the 
kind of Being of everydayness. (1962, p. 164) 
As Tosaka seems to understand Heidegger, one is able to return to an 
original primordiality if one makes use of the possibility, always open to 
Dasein, to detach completely from all conventions associated with the 
‘they’. It is this apparent longing for a return to man’s solitary source that 
Tosaka characterizes as theological, resembling that of the Buddhist monk 
who retreats from the hassle of the world in his monastery (Harootunian, 
2000, p. 127). For this reason, he considers Heidegger not a philosopher 
but a theologian; what Tosaka aims to do is to put the philosophy, rather 
than the theology, of the everyday on the philosophical agenda. 
Sharing the same horror of mass culture, Kuki found himself inspired 
by Heidegger to go and locate the primordiality of Japanese being-in-the-
world in the notion of iki. It is not without irony that, to the nationalistic 
thinkers of this period (Kuki certainly included), the ‘they’ were in fact 
the Westerners, precisely because the Japanese masses emulated Western 
behavior at an unprecedented scale. Equating the ‘they’ with Westerners 
was aggravated by the fact that Heidegger (at least initially) did not seem 
to be impressed with the Japanese, at all. As Pincus mentions in this regard, 
the ‘...apparent universality of Dasein (…) was belied by Heidegger’s insist-
ence that the problematic of Dasein enjoyed an exclusive relation with 
the German language and its linguistic-philosophical past.’ (1991, p. 146) 
Heidegger, or so Pincus suggests, questioned whether the Japanese would 
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be able to appreciate the subtleties of a conceptual system that was 
decidedly Western, and as such beyond their grasp. It is therefore not 
entirely a surprise that, faced with the eurocentric approaches of their 
Western philosophical mentors, his Japanese students would hold 
on to the belief in their own privileged access to universal truth. For 
this, they could turn to Nishida’s early philosophical exposition of the 
notion of ‘pure experience’, and find comfort in the idea that the Japa-
nese way of experiencing the world was somehow more immediate, or 
non-dualistic, than that of others (Sharf, 1993, p. 35).
It is this trend of attempting to show Japanese superiority over 
other peoples that Tosaka lamented, since it further removed the 
Japanese philosophical project from what it had to be doing: address 
current issues, such as the fascism that was taking over the intellectual 
milieu. Attention to local problems of the here-and-now was sacri-
ficed for an abstract universalism concerned with problems of global 
proportions. Tosaka found nationalistic intellectuals such as Kuki ill-
equipped to conceptually deal with a war that ended up escalating 
quickly; at best, they could explain what was happening within their 
conceptual scheme of the world by arguing, as Tanabe eventually did 
in 1939, that ‘...the Japanese nation, with the emperor at its head, 
has the status of a divine, salvific presence in the world.’ (Heisig, 199, 
p. 255) In other words, they considered it the duty of the Japanese 
people to export their spirit to those who lacked it, and found in this 
a justification of the war to subjugate the Asian peoples on the conti-
nent. 
Tosaka, rather than dealing with the branches of the tree, retraced 
the problem back to its roots: Nishida and his appropriation of Ger-
man idealism. In a 1932 newspaper article, he writes:
Nishida’s philosophy, in a word, represents the most superb bourgeois 
philosophy of ideas in our country if not in the world, (…) a fact 
that perhaps everyone has already surmised (…). Though it has been 
able to treat matters that overstep the phenomenon of consciousness 
completely, it can only be called a phenomenology in the highest 
degree. (Tosaka, 1932, as cited in Heisig, 1994, p. 4)
In other words, Nishida had been more concerned with a phenomenology 
of a trans-historical subject than with concrete, material reality. Nishida 
turned inside to universalize the first-person perspective and lost himself 
in the lofty idealism of an eternal world beyond the dualism of the sub-
ject and the object, which meant he had no way to account for historical 
development. What Nishida needed to do was to try and develop his phi-
losophy in such a way as to include an account of history and concrete 
social praxis – as it was, it could not meaningfully account for basic human 
action. Since this idealism was at the heart of the endeavors of the rest of 
the adherents to the Kyoto School, Tosaka deemed it necessary to reject its 
approach to philosophy as a whole. 
Tosaka’s critique of the hermeneutic method itself
I now turn to the critique of hermeneutics itself as formulated in Nihon 
Ideorogīron. Tosaka discusses the development of hermeneutics in the West 
in part one (nihon shugi no hihan to sono gensoku, ‘a critique of Japanism 
and its principles’), chapter one (bunkengakuteki tetsugaku no bunseki, ‘an 
analysis of philological philosophy’), after having given an exposition on 
the relationship between liberalism and hermeneutics in the preface. Since 
his discussion of hermeneutics in Nihon Ideorogīron has not been trans-
lated, I make use of the Japanese original of this work – any translation 
given here is mine.10
In the preface Tosaka states that the fundamental characteristic of liber-
alism is its hermeneutic method. When Tosaka uses the word ‘liberalism’, he 
refers to a mode of thought typical of the cultured elite of his time – to those 
who were more interested in reading and writing literature than in actually 
dealing with the real world. For Tosaka, the Japanese form of liberalism was 
thus preoccupied with a substitute world of meaning produced through 
literary representation (effectively ignoring that the country and most of its 
bureaucrats were still under the spell of centuries of feudalism). This world 
of meaning could easily be manipulated, and flourished because no link 
to actual reality ever had to be established (Tosaka, 1977, pp. 21-23). The 
primary weapon of this cultured elite was a ‘refined’ (seiren sareta) version of 
hermeneutics, which Tosaka calls ‘philologism’. Tosaka writes:
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Philologism11 [bunkengaku shugi] does not base itself on the real 
world, but solely on the etymological interpretation of literature. 
At its most extreme, it takes an arbitrary word from the national 
language, and tailors it for use as a philosophical concept. Literacism12 
[bungaku shugi] applied this mechanism to [literary] representations; 
philologism applies it to words. But if that were all there is to it, 
anybody would be able to see through the superficiality of this so-
called philosophical method. However, if you apply this method to 
ancient texts, then as long as people have no clue what was actually 
happening in the particular historical period the text was produced in, 
it is possible to win some credibility. If you rely on this philologistic 
interpretation (or rather: distortion [kojitsuke]) of ancient texts, you 
can draw a philologistic interpretation out of history as well. The 
‘awareness of national history’ [kokushi no ninshiki] of today’s japanists 
[nihon shugisha] is completely based in this kind of method. (1977, 
pp. 24-25)
As Tosaka sees it, liberalism created the openness required for the circu-
lation of a great many ideas. Liberalism was not so much itself a system 
of ideas, but rather a space able to accommodate every possible conceiv-
able idea. It never really took much root in Japanese society, but mostly 
circulated and left its mark within elite cultural circles. Tosaka argues 
that it was the open space provided by liberalism (in combination with 
its philologistic method) that eventually gave rise to religious absolut-
ism. Liberalism had seemingly upset the old forms of rule, but had also 
failed to resolve the contradictions existing in society. Tosaka observed 
that religion was able to resolve these tensions, but could only do so at 
the ideal, abstract level. Catering to the cultural elite whose religious 
consciousness had been awakened by liberalism, the existing religions 
in Japan were reoriented to satisfy demands for solutions to all kinds 
of societal problems brought about by the introduction of liberalism 
to Japan. It was thus, Tosaka argues, that a pact between religious and 
political absolutism (the doctrine of the emperor as a living god) was 
born (1977, pp. 19-20). This implied that the cultural elite no longer 
concerned themselves with solving actual problems, but contended 
themselves with resolving contradictions at a level detached from real-
ity, using religion as a platform. Tosaka claims that Japanese Buddhists 
were able to reinterpret Buddhism in such a way that it could be seen as 
an expression of the Japanese spirit. Buddhists thus cooperated with the 
absolutist state in order to survive – a state that had tried to eradicate 
them only decades before.
Let me briefly explicate the significance of Tosaka’s argument using 
more recent literature on the topic. Liberalism brought with it the demand 
(mostly through pressure from the international community) for the free-
dom of religion. The Western notion of religion, however, did not exist 
in Japan at the time liberalism was introduced. This is attested to by the 
fact that the word religion, shūkyō, was, like the word for philosophy, 
introduced at the end of the nineteenth century (Krämer, 2013, p. 90). 
The sudden awareness of the existence of ‘religious systems’ that could 
in principle be separated from one another could be argued to have been 
an indirect cause of the Meiji government’s policy of shinbutsu bunri13 
(separating Buddhism from Shinto, implemented immediately in 1868), 
which resulted in the anti-Buddhist violence known as haibutsu kishaku.14 
As Kuroda Toshio demonstrates in his 1981 article Shinto in the History 
of Japanese Religion, the Meiji government attempted to eradicate Bud-
dhism (since it was now considered a foreign religion, whereas before it 
had not been seen as a religion different from Shinto) from its lands and 
tout Shinto as a way of life most closely aligned with the innate spirituality 
of the Japanese. The Japanese went as far as to not qualify Shinto a ‘reli-
gion’ in the Meiji constitution (Kuroda, 1981). Faced with this threat of 
annihilation, Japanese Buddhists had no strategy left to them but to play 
into the hands of state ideology. As Robert Sharf argues in his 1993 article 
The Zen of Japanese Nationalism, this is the true face of the popular Zen 
we know in the West: a nationalistic reinterpretation of original Zen Bud-
dhism in order to safeguard it from eradication by the Meiji government. 
Tosaka’s argument is that all of these japanistic reinterpretations were only 
possible (and necessary) because of the availability of the hermeneutic (or 
philologistic) method that, together with religious consciousness, came 
drifting along with the transmission of liberalism to Japan. 
However, the various applications of the hermeneutic method by the 
Japanese intellectuals of his time formed only half of Tosaka’s problem. 
Hermeneutics itself, Tosaka argues, is unable to deal with actual prob-
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lems because it is fundamentally oriented towards the past – even when 
it pretends to be solely concerned with the present. He shows this by 
recounting the historical development of hermeneutics. Tosaka begins 
this exposition on the history of the hermeneutic method by writing that 
the primary aim of philology is the decoding of ancient texts. However, 
it is an important trait of philology that it generally extends its range 
to also concern itself with decoding present-day texts and various other 
cultural expressions – it tends to liberate itself from merely having to deal 
with language and texts from the past. Moreover, the goal of philology is 
not merely to understand words and expressions, but rather the thought 
and concepts these words and expressions contain. In order to do so, 
the philologist requires the tool of interpretation. Understanding (rikai; 
Verstehen) always occurs by means of interpretation. Tosaka proposes that 
the philosophical kernel of philology lies in hermeneutics, or the sci-
ence of interpretation. This in turn means that philology’s range is, from 
its inception, potentially not limited to only (historical) documents, 
because it involves the characteristically human process of understanding 
(required to be able to interpret at all) and cannot be separated from this. 
Inevitably, then, philology tends to not simply limit itself to the world of 
language, but to become purely philosophical in nature (Tosaka, 1977, 
pp. 37-41).
The one who would first contribute to this turn to ‘philosophical 
philology’ (tetsugakuteki bunkengaku) is Schleiermacher. Tosaka thinks it 
is crucial to realize that before hermeneutics reached Schleiermacher, it 
had already passed through a phase in which it had been primarily used 
by protestants, who applied the method to the Bible, and perfected it as a 
science. The one who brought philosophy and philology closely together, 
Schleiermacher, was himself also a protestant (Tosaka, 1977, pp. 41-42). 
Regarding this, Tosaka writes:
But the fact that Schleiermacher’s philology had philosophical depth, 
could at the same time only mean that it had theological depth (in 
fact, Schleiermacher was a far better theologian than philosopher). 
His theology or philosophy was substantiated by his yearning for the 
infinite. This yearning for the infinite (…) developed into a nostalgic 
longing for bygone worlds, characteristic of German Romanticism. 
(…) We must pay heed to the fact that philology met philosophy, or 
became philosophical, at a time when hermeneutics was characterized 
by nostalgic and idealistic romanticism. (1977, pp. 42-43)
Although Schleiermacher’s philology had not yet become purely philo-
sophical, Tosaka wants to point out that Schleiermacher’s most problematic 
contribution to a philosophical philology lay in his idealism and longing 
for bygone historical worlds. Here I remind the reader that it had been 
Von Koeber who had first introduced the major figures that made up the 
Kyoto School to the works of Schleiermacher. Von Koeber’s approach 
to hermeneutics, too, had clearly been influenced by German Romantic 
thought. His students had indeed resorted to an idealized version of his-
tory to reconstruct the essence of Japanese being with. The reason why 
Schleiermacher’s philology is not yet fully philosophical is that his herme-
neutics still has a strong connection to textual sources. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, it would be Dilthey that did away with this connec-
tion. Concerning Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie, Tosaka writes:
Our lived experience [seikatsu; Erlebnis] objectively expresses itself 
in history. These expressions are the true spirit [seishin; Geist], and by 
understanding this spirit we can first begin to know about our own 
lived experience – precisely the interpretation of expression is the 
understanding of life. (1977, p. 44)
In other words, hermeneutics here becomes the science that is required to 
understand human life. By understanding the history of expression, we 
can understand ourselves in the present. It is no longer a matter of under-
standing past texts; with Dilthey, the domain of hermeneutics is expanded 
to include all forms of human expression. 
Since understanding historical expression is mainly done through 
texts (simply because the past does not come to us in many other forms), 
Dilthey’s approach still remains somewhat faithful to philology’s original 
aim. Where Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics still has a connection to texts, 
and where Dilthey’s has one to history, it is finally in Heidegger that her-
meneutics becomes a matter of pure philosophical speculation (Tosaka, 
1977, pp. 44-45). Heidegger inherits the phenomenological approach of 
45
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Dennis Prooi | Tosaka Jun’s Critique of Hermeneutics
Edmund Husserl – an approach which is the exact opposite of philology. 
The problem with Heidegger’s synthesis of hermeneutics and phenom-
enology is that the latter is fundamentally ahistorical. Tosaka writes:
The meaning of phenomena lies in the fact that they can ever only be 
addressed as a problem by considering their outward appearance. That is 
to say, it is meaningless to address that which lies beyond the phenomena 
when all we have is their surface appearance. (…) If we suppose that 
behind the things, in their depth, lies the expression of the spirit, and 
hermeneutics and philology are methods that obtain from behind the 
things their meaning, then we have to conclude that these methods are 
from the beginning methods that are unfit to deal with these things we 
call phenomena. This is because there is no way to measure the depth15 
of a surface. (1977, pp. 46-47)
Regardless of this, Heidegger tries to formulate a phenomenology that is 
hermeneutical. But in doing so, he severs the former ties hermeneutics had 
to texts and history, and raises it to the level of pure philosophy. A herme-
neutics that is neither textual nor historical, however, can be nothing but 
a caricature of itself. Conversely, a philosophy that applies this type of her-
meneutics cannot be scientific (Tosaka, 1977, p. 48). Regardless of what 
Heidegger wants hermeneutics to do, Tosaka thinks hermeneutics cannot 
be used to analyze actuality. Hermeneutics is always tied to texts (which 
have already been written) and history (which has already passed), mean-
ing it can never tell us anything about the here-and-now. Tosaka’s harsh 
verdict is that Heidegger’s caricature of hermeneutics reduces philosophy 
to a mere play with words (that are without a history or textual basis) 
which only serves to entertain, in both the case of Germany and Japan, 
an educated intelligentsia that is losing itself to a fantasy world shaped by 
fascism. 
To Tosaka, the japanistic thought of Heidegger’s students Kuki 
and Watsuji is not simply the result of a local, Japanese problem, but is 
essentially a (theological) flight from reality that was inherited with the 
introduction of liberalism and its method – hermeneutics – to Japan. In 
a sense, their use of hermeneutics is actually a perfectly proper one – so 
long as we realize that they, as students of Heidegger, employ his carica-
tural version of hermeneutics, or what Tosaka refers to as ‘philologism’. 
According to Tosaka, a return to pre-Heideggerian hermeneutics does not 
solve anything, since hermeneutics, even when it pretends to deal with 
the here-and-now, still fundamentally resorts to the past (imagined, ideal-
ized, or otherwise) in order to obtain any sort of meaning. Tosaka deems 
hermeneutics completely unable to assist us in solving problems facing us 
at this moment, since it is not concerned with the present in any way (but 
only concerns itself with what has already been done). It therefore belongs 
to those who can afford to remain distant from the world, and in fact do 
so by safely remaining inside of the archives and universities. The moment 
philologism comes to shape political ideology, the fantasies of detached 
intelligentsia come to overrule common sense. According to Tosaka, this is 
precisely where Japan went wrong. 
An evaluation of Tosaka’ critique of hermeneutics
Tosaka’s critique of hermeneutics forms an important part of his staunch 
opposition to Kyoto School philosophy. Tosaka ridicules Kyoto School 
philosophers for using Western methods (i.e. hermeneutics) to recover the 
Japanese spirit from an idealized past – an undertaking that according to 
him is completely meaningless, but dangerous nonetheless, since it creates 
a pseudo-world of meaning easily manipulated by those in power. Two 
related questions are in order here: is Tosaka’s characterization of herme-
neutics, namely as a method that is fundamentally welded to the past, fair? 
If it is not, what consequences does this have for his criticism of Kyoto 
School thought?
Hermeneutics has moved beyond Tosaka. It is unfortunate that Tosaka 
died in 1945; had he lived to see the further development of philosophy 
in the post-war years, he would have undoubtedly had to reconsider his 
evaluation of hermeneutics upon reading Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 1960 
work Wahrheit und Methode. It is important to realize that the philoso-
phers Tosaka discusses (from Schleiermacher to Dilthey) all consider 
hermeneutics to be a method that can first and foremost be used to recover 
meaning. Gadamer’s understanding of hermeneutics is, however, radically 
different. Not the reconstruction of past meaning, but the construction of 
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novel contexts of meaning is what constitutes hermeneutical understand-
ing. While Tosaka, having a traditional understanding of hermeneutics, 
deems the endeavors of the Kyoto School to recover the Japanese spirit 
completely meaningless, Gadamer would argue the exact opposite. This 
is to say that, to Gadamer, tradition is not something which has its kernel 
in some distant past; it is rather a process, a pendulum that constantly 
swings between past and present. Tradition is a product of both the past 
and the present, and is meaningful (i.e. can be understood) because of this. 
In Gadamer, then, hermeneutics reaches a stage at which it is undeniably 
connected to the present. His hermeneutics arguably forms a counterexam-
ple to Tosaka’s claim that hermeneutics is fundamentally oriented towards 
the past. Hermeneutics does not only concern that which has already been 
done – it is rather constantly happening and no final understanding can 
ever be obtained. With Gadamer, we can see how the Japanese spirit is not 
recovered from, and does not merely dwell in, some literary pseudo-world 
constituted by past texts, but is in fact, as an idea, a concrete part of practi-
cal attempts at reorienting Japanese identity in the here-and-now. Tosaka’s 
strict separation of the historical world from a pseudo-world of meaning 
prevents him from seeing the two are strongly connected. Gadamer’s her-
meneutics could supply Tosaka precisely with the kind of method he needs 
to understand and interpret daily customs, not only in relation to history 
as it unfolds in the minimal repetition of the everyday, but also in connec-
tion to long-term historical development. That Tosaka is indeed in need 
of such a method is quite aptly pointed out by Harry Harootunian, who 
writes: ‘However much Tosaka condemned the contemporary practice of 
hermeneutics (especially of his older teacher Nishida Kitarō) as a bourgeois 
philosophy, his own approach to the modern experience was just as philo-
sophic and interpretative’ (2000, xviii).
Tosaka falls victim to a view of history that is too one-sided. He fails 
to see how past and present, self and other, ideal and material, the elite 
and the masses, are constantly intertwined. He strictly separates what 
is Western from what is Japanese, and from this position claims that all 
the Kyoto School philosophers have done is, in fact, thoroughly West-
ern. This, I would be inclined to argue, robs the Japanese of any sort of 
agency. He seems to be caught precisely in the kind of thinking that caused 
the Meiji government to pursue its policy of shinbutsu bunri (separating 
Shinto from Buddhism). In doing so, it failed to see that after more than a 
millennium, Buddhism was no longer merely a ‘foreign religion’, but had 
in fact become an essential part of Japanese identity. This is because, as 
Gadamer would point out, the introduction of Buddhism involved swing-
ing between the known and the unknown to such an extent that already 
after two hundred years (but arguably ever since it first reached to Japan) it 
had, in the works of such prominent monks as Kūkai and Saichō, become 
undeniably Japanese. Applying this insight to Tosaka’s evaluation of Kyoto 
School philosophy, it becomes possible to see how Japanese intellectuals 
actively participated in the formulation of a novel kind of philosophy, one 
that cleared the way for, as Gadamer would call it, a fusion of horizons. 
This novel kind of philosophy formed a context of meaning that allowed 
the Japanese philosophers to engage with an intellectual tradition foreign 
to them. In this important sense, the Kyoto School philosophers did not 
just emulate, and were not mere passive recipients of, Western philosophy 
and its methods of inquiry, as Tosaka would have us believe. 
Conclusion
Although we need to remain wary of the extent to which Tosaka’s own 
methodological orientation limits a fair assessment of the Kyoto School’s 
achievements, he does expose a fundamental problem at the heart of its 
endeavors. Quite a few Kyoto School intellectuals were preoccupied with a 
dubious use of the hermeneutic method in order to uncover concepts from 
an idealized past that were supposed to express eternal characteristics of 
the Japanese spirit. It is therefore important to be vigilant of the concepts 
that the Kyoto School philosophers developed using this method. Tosaka’s 
greatest contribution may have been that he offers us a way in which to 
evaluate these concepts critically, namely by investigating to what extent 
they are the product of what he calls ‘philologism’.
The debate on Nishida’s involvement with fascism is still on-going, 
but it is clear that Nishida’s success inspired many to use philologistic 
methods. Nishida’s central notion from his early works, junsui keiken, 
could all too easily be adopted for building a case for the privileged access 
of the Japanese to noumenal reality, as Suzuki and Watsuji did. Concepts 
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developed from such hollow claims (as quite a few Kyoto School thinkers 
were inclined to) should have no place in the philosophical vocabulary 
of the West, and should hardly deserve any attention from comparative 
philosophers – at best, they should serve as historical curiosities. At the 
same time, however, the debate on Nishida’s philosophy is far from over. 
Nishida may have inspired a problematic following, but he himself seems 
to have attempted to combat the militarism of his time on many occasions. 
Any reevaluation of the Kyoto School that starts from Nishida’s philoso-
phy should address Tosaka’s challenge head on, and attempt to show that 
Nishida’s motivations and methodology were different from what Tosaka 
attributes to him. This may also be a way of revitalizing a current of 
thought that has met with a lot of criticism both in the country where it 
originated, and abroad. With Tosaka, any evaluation of the Kyoto School 
should not end, but begin.
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Notes
1. By convention, Japanese names are written with the family name coming first. I will do 
so in all cases except that of D.T. Suzuki. 
2. 哲学, made up of the characters for ‘wisdom’ and ‘study’.
3. 古事記, ‘record of ancient matters’.
4. 日本書紀, ‘chronicle of Japan’.
5. The characters for ‘Meiji’, 明治, are suggestive of this, literally meaning ‘enlightened 
rule’.
6. 日本古代文化, ‘ancient Japanese culture’.
7. 万葉集, literally ‘collection of ten thousands leaves’, believed to have been compiled 
sometime after 759 CE.
8. 「いき」の構造, translated as The Structure of Iki.
9. 日本イデオロギー論, ‘essay on Japanese ideology’.
10. I found myself aided by the brief summary of Tosaka’s critique of hermeneutics pro-
vided by Leslie Pincus in his 1996 book Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan: Kuki 
Shūzō and the Rise of National Aesthetics, pp. 164-165. Since I cover the same material in 
more detail, I do not cite his work, but knowing the general direction into which Tosaka is 
headed made him significantly easier to translate.
11. The Japanese word used here, bunkengaku shugi (文献学主義), has no equivalent in 
English, since it appears to be neologism invented by Tosaka. In Japanese, adding -shugi to 
a term implies its doctrinary variant. For example, capitalism is shihon shugi (資本主義) 
and liberalism is jiyū shugi (自由主義). Since bunkengaku means philology, bunkengaku 
shugi could be (perhaps rather clumsily) translated as philologism.
12. See footnote 11. In this case, the Japanese original is bungaku shugi (文学主義). Bun-
gaku means literature.
13. 神仏分離, ‘separate Shinto from Buddhism’.
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14. 廃仏毀釈, ‘abolish Buddhism, destroy the teachings of Sākyamuni’. Sākyamuni is the 
name of the historical Buddha.
15. The word used here is atsusa (厚さ) which literally translates to ‘thickness’.
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